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Abstract
Ethernet is the most promising solution to reduce complexity and enhance the band-
width in the next generation in-car networks. Dedicated Ethernet protocols enable the
real-time aspects in such networks. One promising candidate is the IEEE 802.1Q Time-
Sensitive Networking protocol suite. Common Ethernet technologies, however, increases
the vulnerability of the car infrastructure as they widen the attack surface for many com-
ponents. In this paper proposes an IEEE 802.1Qci based algorithm that on the one hand,
protects against DoS attacks by metering incoming Ethernet frames. On the other hand,
it adapts to the behavior of the Credit Based Shaping algorithm, which was standardized
for Audio/Video Bridging, the predecessor of Time-Sensitive Networking. A simulation of
this proposed Credit Based Metering algorithm evaluates the concept.
1 Introduction
In today’s vehicles, a multitude of sensors, actors, and electronic control units (ECUs) are
used to enable enhanced performance, comfort, and safety through advanced driver assistance
systems. Even autonomous driving will be realized in future generations. These additions result
in complex communication over different proprietary bus technologies in multiple domains.
Ethernet technologies are used to set up efficient and straightforward communication in
future generations. Real-time Ethernet protocols enable the compliance of communication
requirements and enhance the reliability of Standard Ethernet. Promising candidates are the
Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) protocols by the IEEE (https://1.ieee802.org/tsn/).
The main focus of those protocols is Quality of Service guarantees. The integration of future
cars in the IoT context opens its systems to global communication. These online capabilities
and the domain interconnection increases the attack surface of safety-critical functions like
brakes and the motor control units. Attacks could manipulate driving characteristics and could
provide fatal consequences for vehicle and passengers.
Therefore, security has to be an essential goal for the development of the next generations
of on-board communications technologies. The TSN standard IEEE 802.1Qci addresses some
security concerns by filtering ingress traffic on network node ports.
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This work provides a simulation-based evaluation of IEEE 802.1Qci with a Credit Based
Meter (CBM) algorithm concept. This concept enforces the reserved bandwidth of a stream and
is one solution to protect network nodes from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. IEEE 802.1Qci
and the CBM concept are implemented in the OMNeT++ environment to enable evaluations.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents previous and related work. In Section
3, the developed simulation environment, and the credit based metering are shown. Section
4 presents a case study followed by an evaluation of the implemented simulation models and
concepts. The paper closes with a conclusion and outlook in section 5.
2 Background & Related Work
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Figure 1: IEEE 802.1Qci per-stream filtering and
policing
The on-board network of a vehicle is
a highly distributed system defined by
its electronic control units (ECUs). At
present, proprietary bus technologies
(CAN, MOST, FlexRay) enable the com-
munication of control units.
Future development will lead to
a stepwise transition towards flat,
switched Ethernet networks [6]. Such
networks have to support simultane-
ous transmission of messages with dif-
ferent priorities to maintain safe time-
critical communication. Real-time Eth-
ernet protocols are used to guarantee the
different quality of service classes.
The Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) [5] real-time Ethernet standard is a collection of
protocols which adapts to network requirements of cyber-physical systems. Domains for this
protocol suite are, for example, industrial control facilities or in-car networks.
The focus in this work is the sub-standard IEEE 802.1Qci [4]. It describes an ingress
control through per-stream filtering and policing. Figure 1 shows the structure of the filtering
and policing specification. The shown mechanism has an instance after each port ingress of a
TSN networking device. The result is that all ingress traffic is filtered. There are three stages
an incoming frame has to pass through before it is queued. The first stage consists of a set
of stream filters. They configure which gates and meters are responsible for handling frames
of a specific stream id. Secondly, there are stream gates. Those have one of the two states
”OPEN” or ”CLOSED”. This state can change based on a static defined schedule based on
a system-wide clock. If the gate is ”CLOSED”, the frame will be dropped. If the responsible
gate is in the state ”OPEN”, the frame will be handled by the responsible flow meter. The
flow meters stage contain unique algorithms to assert if a message is allowed. After the meter
allows a frame, it gets queued in the network node for subsequent forwarding or processing.
This work presents a meter concept called Credit Based Meter (CBM) (See section 3).
The importance of security measures for in-car networks is shown in various related work [2],
[10]. A fundamental work is from Checkoway et al. [1]. They examine interfaces that are part
of the attack surface in a car. These interfaces are classified in three categories: Physical access
(ODB-II, CD, USB), short distance wireless access (Bluetooth, WiFi, Remote-Keyless-Entry)
and long distance wireless access (GPS, digital radio, mobile services). The authors gained
access to the on-board network in each category using reverse engineering and debugging.
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Miller and Valasek [9] described in detail how to obtain control over an unaltered passenger
vehicle. They gained control over safety-critical elements like engines and brakes over a remote
cellular connection of the infotainment system. The infotainment system is part of the inter-
nal CAN-based communication infrastructure, and CAN buses in this infrastructure contain
virtually no security measures. At this point, the authors used reverse engineering to get infor-
mation over the communication between in-car control units. In the next step CAN messages
are forwarded over the infotainment system into the internal communication which is received
and processed by the control units.
In consequence, security measures must be included in future automotive communication
systems. Simulations of in-car networks [11] are an essential method to study the behavior of
such systems in detail. This work presents one solution for protecting the in-car communication
from DoS attacks and analyses it in the simulator. In those scenarios, a compromised stream
is used to burst frames into networking devices to overload there capabilities. The result could
be lost or delayed frames of not compromised streams.
3 Credit Based Metering
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Figure 2: Credit Based Metering state machine
The Credit Based Meter (CBM) is an
ingress counterpart for the Credit Based
Shaper (CBS) egress behavior defined in
IEEE 802.1Qbv [3]. In general, a CBM is
based on a credit value manipulated by
two different gradients called ”idleslope”
and ”sendslope”. Frame reception is
allowed when the credit is greater or
equal to zero. When the credit is lower
than zero, an incoming frame will be dis-
carded.
idleslope = RB (1)
sendslope = RB −B (2)
These gradients are composed of an
accumulated reserved bandwidth (RB)
of the streams passing the meter and
a total bandwidth (B) of the port (See
equation 1 and 2).
Additionally, the CBM contains a maximum burst size parameter (Burstmax) configuring
the maximum count of frames that are allowed in an incoming stream burst. This is used in
combination with the sending duration (Tduration) of one frame. Tduration is composed of the
frame size (FSstream), the port bandwidth (B) and the Ethernet inter frame gap (Tifg) to
calculate the maximum credit value (Creditmax) of the CBM shown in equations 3 and 4.
Tduration =
FSstream
B
+ Tifg (3)
Creditmax = |sendslope| ∗ Tduration ∗ (Burstmax − 1) (4)
Because a burst of one frame is allowed when the credit is 0 Burstmax has to be substracted
by one. So the definition of Burstmax = 1 results in Creditmax = 0.
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The CBM has two states. They are ”RUNNING RECEIVING ALLOWED” (R-RA) and
”RUNNING RECEIVING FORBIDDEN” (R-RF). When the CBM starts the state is R-RA
and the credit is set to zero. The credit starts to increases according to idleslope till the first
frame is incoming or the credit reaches the maximum (Creditmax).
In the R-RA state, the credit is decreased by ”sendslope” for the receiving duration of a
frame. When the frame is queued the credit increases again with ”idleslope”. If the credit is
greater or equal to zero, a new frame reception is allowed, and the credit decreases again by
”sendslope”. When the credit reaches the maximum, it stays on this value until a frame is
incoming.
If the credit is lower than 0, the state will be switched to R-RF. In R-RF each incoming
frame will be deleted. Simultaneously, the credit increases with ”idleslope”. The state is
changed back to R-RA when the credit reaches 0.
In figure 2, an example of the CBM algorithm behavior is shown. Firstly, the state is R-RA
and the credit is 0 and increases according to ”idleslope” until the first frame arrives (see t1
in figure 2). The credit decreases by ”sendslope” for the duration of the frame (t2 in figure
2). Now the state is changed to R-RF and the credit increases by ”idleslope” till it reaches
0. The state changes to R-RA, and the credit increases further until the next frame arrives.
This is delayed by an incoming best effort (BE) frame (t3 in figure 2). The next frame arrives
and the credit is decreased again (t4 to t5 in figure 2). The credit increases till the third frame
receiving starts (t6 in figure 2). So again the credit decreases by ”sendslope” until the end of
the transmission duration.
The performance of the CBM is dependent on Burstmax. A target configuration of this
parameter is as low as possible and still supports a valid worst-case scenario. On the one side,
this is because of the counterpart CBS. The valid maximum frame burst of a stream that is
produced by a CBS algorithm egress is dependent on its specific worst-case scenario. On the
other side, an attack creating a maximum frame burst could not harm the network because it
is designed to support the worst-case traffic workload.
There are different ways to determine a minimal Burstmax value. One example is analyzing
the worst-case burst behavior for each streams output port (Burstout). Burstmax has to be
calculated, as shown in equation 5 to allow one closeup frame following the burst.
Burstmax = Burstout + 1 (5)
Another example of determining a Burstmax value is by simulating different configurations
to find one that fits the requirements.
4 Case Study
This section evaluates the integration of the Credit Based Meter algorithm inside IEEE
802.1Qci. This is done by using the OMNeT++ (https://omnetpp.org/) simulation
environment with INET (https://inet.omnetpp.org/) and our CoRE4INET framework.
CoRE4INET enables in-car network simulations [7] and the simulations of TSN features [8].
For this work, the CoRE4INET is extended with IEEE 802.1Qci and CBM implementations.
The chosen topology is known from previous work [8] and is designed to create critical links
with multiple concurrent traffic. Figure 3 shows this topology. In this topology, time-triggered
traffic is based on TDMA with the highest priority. Two configurations are simulated. The first
is a configuration with active CBM filtering. The second one emplaces a compromised ”Node
1” into the simulation, which is spamming a DoS attack into the network.
For both simulations the base configuration is as follows:
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Figure 3: Simulation Topology
• All links are configured with a bandwidth of 100 Mbit/s.
• ”Node 1” and ”Node 2” are the sources of ”Stream 1” and ”Stream 2” with ”Node 8”
as its destination. Both streams have a reserved route with an individual bandwidth of
25 Mbit/s. Each stream is passing a CBM on all devices and gates are ”OPEN”.
• Full-size time-triggered frames are generated by ”Node 3”, ”Node 4”, ”Node 5” and ”Node
6”. The first two are received by ”Node 7” and the latter by ”Node 9”. In all switches, a
gap of 123µs is configured to allow intermediate frame bursts.
• For extra background traffic ”Node 10” is broadcasting full-size best-effort Ethernet
frames. All nodes are replying by sending a full-size best-effort frame back to ”Node
10”.
The worst-case output stream burst sizes (Burstout) are known in this base configuration.
They are 2 for ”Node 1” and ”Node 2” and, because of the concurrent TDMA traffic 4 for
”Switch 1” and ”Switch 2”. Therefore the Burstmax value for CBM filtering in ”Switch 1” is 3
for both input ports and 5 for the input metering in ”Switch 2” and ”Switch 3” (See equation
5 in section 3).
The results shown in this section are a selection of results generated by the simulations. All
shown simulation results are based on 10 seconds duration runs.
The first result set (Figure 4 and 5) presents and compares the end-to-end latency of the
streams in both configurations. Due to the assumption that valid packets are not influenced by
the CBM, these latencies are expected to be nearly the same.
The end-to-end latency of both streams in the configuration with CBM filtering is shown
in figure 4. In this configuration, each node and switch is using a CBM ingress control on each
port and for each stream. The two histograms show the number of frames that arrived at the
target with a specific consolidated end-to-end latency. Blue shows these results for ”Stream 1”
and grey for ”Stream 2”.
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Figure 5: End-to-end latency of frames per
stream during an attack
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Figure 6: Impact of CBM on Stream 1 in Switch 1
Figure 5 shows the end-to-end
latency of the streams in a configu-
ration where ”Node 1” is corrupted.
All nodes and switches are using
CBM ingress control again. The dif-
ference is that ”Node 1” is generat-
ing the ”Stream 1” packets in an in-
valid pattern. This is done by spam-
ming subsequent frames.
The comparison shows no signif-
icant differences between the config-
urations. This demonstrates that
CBM is successfully enforcing the
correct behavior. This is done by
removing all ”Stream 1” frames of
the corrupted source that would ex-
cel the reserved bandwidth. There-
fore ”Stream 2” is not affected by
”Node 1” spamming.
Figure 6 presents output bandwidth size and number of frames dropped in the CBM in
”Switch 1” for ”Stream 1” produced by eight simulation runs. For each run, the input bandwidth
produced by ”Node 1” is incremented. The reserved bandwidth of 25 Mbit/s is fixed. It is
expected that the output would not cross this reserved bandwidth value.
The result reflects the wanted CBM behavior. No frame is dropped, and the output band-
width is the same as the input bandwidth until the input size overshoots the reserved bandwidth
of 25 Mbit/s. At this point, the number of frames dropped increases as a function of the input
bandwidth. Because each frame, which would exceed the reserved bandwidth, will be dropped
by the CBM.
A selected section of this CBM algorithm is shown in Figure 7. It presents the credit
value, frame ingress, and output bandwidth for a specific timeslot of the simulation. ”Node
1” produces a valid ”Stream 1” packet flow of 25 Mbit/s in this scenario. Although the CBM
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output bandwidth never exceeds the reserved bandwidth over time, it allows short crossings
like its counterpart CBS.
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Figure 7: Section of CBM credit, frame, and bandwidth
Because no frame is received be-
tween 146.625 ms and 146.75 ms the
credit increases as a function of this
duration. This continues until it
reaches its maximum, which is de-
pendent on Burstmax.
In this case, the Burstmax value
is 3. This results in a Creditmax
value of ca. 4650. The correspond-
ing equation 6 shows the calculation
of this Creditmax value.
Next, a continuous burst of 3
frames would be allowed. In this
case, just two subsequent packages
are incoming. This results in a
zoomed in bandwidth of 50 Mbit/s
between 146.75 ms and 146.875 ms.
This shows that the reserved
bandwidth could be overshoot mas-
sively for shorter periods. This is
dependent on the configuration of
Burstmax. From this also follows
that Burstmax value has no influ-
ence on the over-time bandwidth re-
striction. Buffer sizes have to sup-
port the Burstmax values to guar-
antee that they did not overflow.
The CBM enforces this upper
barrier. For a configured network,
the maximum latencies could be calculated and are valid even if a malfunction or attack re-
sults in an invalid behavior of individual network participants. This protects the integrity and
availability of the in-car communication system.
Creditmax = |sendslope| ∗ Tduration ∗ (Burstmax − 1)
≈ 75 Mbit/s ∗ 31 µs ∗ (3− 1) = 4650 (6)
5 Conclusion & Outlook
The demand for interconnecting an increasing multitude of sensors, actors, and ECUs in today’s
vehicles guides in-car networks to adapt real-time Ethernet technologies. Flattening the network
in this way creates new vulnerabilities within the in-car network. The CBM is a solution for
a TSN meter algorithm to protect the system against DoS attacks. It protects the integrity
and availability of an in-car communication system by individually controlling the stream input
on each ingress port of the network. The CBM allows all valid traffic patterns of a CBS
algorithm. An attacker could use the burst behavior to shortly overcome the reserved bandwidth
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restrictions, but the credit boundary limits the bandwidth over an extended period. This limit
is the same as the reserved bandwidth. The maximum burst parameter has to be as low as
possible to gain the best performance. However, it still must allow the valid worst-case scenario
of a specific input port. This trade-off between performance and worst-case estimation has to
be considered.
In future work, the compatibility with other TSN traffic shaper concepts will be evaluated.
Furthermore combined operation of different ingress control mechanisms will be simulated. In
addition, the benefits of the ingress control metrics for anomaly detection will be analyzed.
Our simulation models and the extensions in this work are published at sim.core-rg.de.
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